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The core aim of this book is to ‘demonstrate why the use of military force against Afghanistan, beginning on 7 October 2001, was unlawful’ (p. 233).  It therefore takes a fresh look at a use of force that was, at the time, accepted relatively uncritically as being a lawful action of self-defence.  That is not to say, of course, that all scholars saw the intervention as lawful in 2001,​[1]​ but the contrary voices that did exist were to a large extent soon lost in the noise of the louder and more widespread legal objections to the use of force against Iraq in 2003.  This reappraisal of the lawfulness of the Afghanistan intervention makes good use of eight years of hindsight.

Terrorism, War and International Law is a book steeped in history; it draws on historical accounts of terrorism and armed conflict, and state and scholarly reactions to these phenomena.  It also, in its early sections, makes use of conflict data analysis to provide a qualitative statistical understanding of the changing nature of conflict.  Similarly, when the book does turn to more conventional legal analysis (chapters four and five), it is strongly grounded in actual incidents of state practice to illustrate and establish positions taken regarding customary international law: a coalface approach to the subject that is regrettably absent from many works of international law scholarship.  In other words, the book takes a ‘wide angle lens’ approach to its core question.  For this reviewer, this is very much to the author’s credit.  

However, one could argue a little too much of the book is dedicated to the contextual background underpinning the central analysis: of the five substantive chapters here, only one (the final chapter) actually examines the 2001 conflict at all.  This potentially makes the book slightly top heavy, with lots of background and comparatively little application.  The trade off here, though, is a willingness to forgo a more streamlined approach to the question posed, in favour of as comprehensive an understanding of the wider context as possible.  This approach ultimately gives the conclusions reached a greater weight than they may otherwise have had.

The first substantive section, chapter two, considers the changing nature of conflict, primarily through conflict data analysis.  The data here is wisely drawn from a number of sources, primarily from various independent projects focused on ‘patterns of conflict occurrence’ (p. 12).  Based on this data it is convincingly argued that 9/11 did not represent a fundamental change in the nature of conflict or terrorist activity.

Chapter three examines the notion of terrorism and its historical development.  It particularly focuses on the problems associated with defining the concept, both for lawyers and political scientists.  The main contribution to the book’s central argument here is that such definitional problems have contributed to states traditionally viewing terrorist acts as criminal actions – to be dealt with through judicial mechanisms (international and domestic) – and not as acts of war.  Indeed, it is argued that this is a desirable approach to responding to terrorist activity, as opposed to the use of military force (pp. 65-68).  This feeds into later claims that the use of force against Afghanistan was a relatively unusual response to a terrorist attack.  This chapter is worthwhile in and of itself and contributes well to the overall context of the 2001 intervention.  Having said this, it is perhaps questionable whether the arguable desirability or commonality of a criminal law based response to terrorism has a bearing on the lawfulness of an alternative approach involving the use of force.

Chapters four and five focus on the specifics of the law on the use of force.  They are split chronologically, with chapter four examining the development of law on the use of force from 1919-1944, and chapter five covering the period from 1945-2008.  As such, they essentially constitute one substantive chapter – in terms of content and contribution to the work – with the split presumably being one of convenience.  This section of the book is probably its most successful aspect.  Again, the topic is approached in a commendably comprehensive manner; these chapters essentially set out and critique the key elements of law on the use of force from 1945 to the present.  That this is done in just a hundred pages without seeming superficial is noteworthy.  

It must be admitted that nothing in these chapters is especially groundbreaking and it will offer no surprises for anyone who is relatively familiar with the international law on the use of force today.  Equally, these chapters present the law in this area in a clear and concise manner; the analysis here is relatively uncontroversial and is suitable for both international lawyers and those unfamiliar with the discipline.  This reviewer fully intends to prescribe these chapters as ‘essential reading’ for his final year LLB international law students studying the law on the use of force.

The crucial final chapter provides the book’s central contention, that the 2001 Afghanistan intervention was unlawful.  A number of arguments are set out to support this conclusion.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, some of these arguments are more convincing than others.  For example, the position that the intervention failed to meet the requirement of ‘proportionality’ is a difficult one to refute.  Simply put: ‘Regime change was a step too far’ (p. 213).  Indeed, the consideration of proportionality – and how one calculates it in the context of self-defence – is particularly nuanced here.

A compelling argument is also made that it was not ‘necessary’ for there to be a military response in 2001.  This is both because the attacks of 9/11 were over before any response took place and because non-forcible options were available to respond to any ongoing threat (pp. 206-210).  As such, it is argued that the only way self-defence could have been invoked in 2001 was in its highly controversial ‘pre-emptive’ manifestation.  Indeed, it would have had to have been pre-emptive self-defence of the ‘non-imminent’ variety, in that there was no sign of another imminent attack against the United States following 9/11 (pp. 218-221).  This ‘Bush doctrine’ of non-imminent pre-emptive self-defence is then rejected: ‘If all states were permitted to...employ force in “self-defence” whenever they identify a source of future attacks, the list of potential targets could be endless...the limitations on the use of force in self-defence would be undermined to such an extent that they would be rendered virtually meaningless’ (p. 221).  Even in the post-Bush world, such contributions to the ongoing debate surrounding non-imminent pre-emptive self-defence remain important, given President Obama’s apparent willingness to retain the doctrine.​[2]​

Not all of the analysis in the crucial final chapter is as compelling, however.  For example, the much relied on argument that there was no ‘armed attack’ against the United States because 9/11 was perpetrated by non-state actors is far from as straightforward as is indicated.  It is true, as the author points out (pp. 152-153), that the ICJ has appeared to require a level of state involvement both in 1986 (Nicaragua case) and in 2004 (Israeli Wall advisory opinion).  However, there could have been more consideration of the counter argument that state practice is now shifting towards allowing self-defence actions in response to attacks perpetrated by non-state actors,​[3]​  as well as of the objections raised by various ICJ judges to the Court’s majority position on this issue (briefly noted in footnote 326, p. 153).  The author also falls into the trap of assuming that the level of state involvement required by the ICJ for an armed attack necessarily equates to the state responsibility ‘effective control’ test (pp. 154-157 and pp. 202-205).  In fact these tests are, conceptually, different things: one relates to whether a state is responsible for a breach of international law and the other to whether an armed attack has occurred.  There is nothing to be found in the jurisprudence of the ICJ, or elsewhere, to indicate that they are necessarily synonymous.​[4]​

Nonetheless, the final chapter makes a convincing case that the 2001 intervention was unlawful.  This is particularly so when the arguments presented are taken cumulatively.  In this respect, the book must be seen as being extremely successful.  However, there remains a major issue here: the acceptance by a large number of states that the action was lawful.  It is rightly pointed out that a failure to condemn the intervention may have its basis in the overwhelming culture of sympathy towards the United States following 9/11 (p. 177 and p. 183).  Moreover, it is also convincingly argued that a failure to condemn is not the same as accepting an action as being lawful (pp. 189-202).

However, this ignores the crucial fact that states did not merely fail to condemn the United States: many expressly condoned the action (with a significant number explicitly stating that it was lawful).​[5]​  The international sympathy for the United States almost certainly did contribute to such widespread support for the intervention (along with other factors, not least its homogonous superpower status).  Nonetheless, support for the lawfulness of the use of force by states must surely be legally relevant, given how customary international law is made and altered.  Whether the reactions of states here were relevant enough to counteract the application of the law as it stood prior to the intervention is another matter.  This book convincingly demonstrates that such an application leads to a determination of unlawfulness.  The question, then, is whether the law on the use of force could have been ‘instantly’ adapted by way of the acceptance of the intervention.  This goes to the heart of customary international law theory and is perhaps beyond the scope of the book under review.  Nonetheless, the explicit acceptance of the action as being lawful, by states, probably needed to be considered in more detail.
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